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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
PlaintifffAppellee, : 
v. : 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, : Case No. 20000728-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jurisdictional nature of the Serious Youth Offender ("S.Y.O.") Act is apparent 
from the language of the statute, its location in the Juvenile Courts Act, the surrounding 
direct file and certification statutes, and Utah case law. Because Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-602(10) creates a jurisdictional rule that mandates that the juvenile court regain 
jurisdiction, Appellant's claim that the case should have been remanded to the juvenile 
court was not waived when he pled guilty to third degree felony aggravated assault. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10), which requires that the juvenile court regain 
jurisdiction when the "charges'1 are dismissed or result in acquittal, required remand to the 
juvenile court in this case when Appellant/Defendant Joseph Tunzi ("Appellant" or 
"Joseph") was acquitted of the charge of attempted homicide. The term "charges" refers 
to charges for serious youth offenses which originate in juvenile court and which provide 
the basis for bindover to district court. In this case, attempted homicide was the only 
charge which originated in juvenile court and on which Appellant was bound over to 
district court. Subsection (10) therefore required that the juvenile court regain 
jurisdiction when the jury signed the verdict form acquitting Joseph of that charge. 
Nothing in the Act suggests that the relevant charges include lesser offenses for 
which the state requests instructions at trial. Case law from other jurisdictions 
interpreting direct file statutes that do not contain language similar to that of subsection 
(10) provide no guidance. Moreover, some courts have concluded that even in the 
absence of language similar to that of subsection (10), the juvenile court regains 
jurisdiction when the juvenile is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for adult 
court jurisdiction. The state's argument taken to its conclusion would result in remand to 
the juvenile court only when all charges bound over pursuant to subsection (7) and the 
lessers for those charges were dismissed or resulted in acquittal; in other words, only 
when no charges or convictions existed. This would render the language of subsection 
(10) meaningless. The language of subsections (7) and (10) of the S.Y.O. Act and a 
comparison of that language with the language of the direct file and certification statutes 
establish that the district court loses jurisdiction when the juvenile is convicted of a lesser 
offense and acquitted of the offense which provided the basis for the bindover. 
This Court need not reach the state's argument that the "charges" in subsection 
(10) include all lesser offenses because in this case, the aggravated assault lessers were 
not necessarily included in the charge of attempted homicide. Both versions of 
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aggravated assault contain additional elements which are not contained in attempted 
homicide. The juvenile judge therefore did not find those elements when he bound 
Joseph over on the charge of attempted homicide. The requirement of subsection (7) that 
the juvenile court judge find probable cause to support a bindover in order to send 
charges to district court was not met. Since the aggravated assault lessers did not comply 
with the S.Y.O. procedure, they are not relevant "charges" under subsection (10). 
The state makes an alternative argument that even if the S.Y.O. Act requires 
remand to juvenile court when the juvenile is acquitted of all offenses which require 
S.Y.O. treatment, this case did not require remand because Joseph was not acquitted of 
second degree felony aggravated assault, an offense which qualifies for such treatment. 
This argument fails not only because the second degree felony was not charged or bound 
over in compliance with the S.Y.O. procedure, but also because (1) the second degree 
felony was dismissed and subsection (10) requires remand in the event of a dismissal or 
acquittal, and (2) the protection against Double Jeopardy precludes further prosecution on 
the second degree felony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. JOSEPH DID NOT WAIVE HIS JURISDICTIONAL 
ARGUMENT. 
A review of the language of the S.Y.O Act, the certification and direct file 
statutes, and In re E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1991), the only case on which the 
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state relies, demonstrates that Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601(10) is jurisdictional and 
therefore was not waived when Joseph pled guilty to the third degree felony. Chapter 3a 
of Title 78 is "known as the ' Juvenile Court Act of 1996.'" Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-101 
(1996). Part 6 of that chapter, where the S.Y.O. Act is found, titled "Transfer of 
Jurisdiction", outlines circumstances where jurisdiction is transferred from juvenile to 
district court. Part 6 contains the direct file, certification and S.Y.O. Act, all of which 
address circumstances under which a district court can exercise jurisdiction over a 
juvenile. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-601, 602, 603 (1996). Since all three statutes in 
part 6 of section 78-3a limit district court jurisdiction over a juvenile, it is apparent that 
the S.Y.O. Act, direct file and certification statutes are jurisdictional in nature. 
Section 78-3a-602 outlines the limits on district court jurisdiction over a juvenile 
sixteen or older who is charged by Information with one of the nine S.Y.O. offenses. 
Pursuant to section 78-3a-602(3)(d) and (4), the district court never obtains jurisdiction 
over a juvenile charged with a serious youth offender offense if all of the conditions of 
subsection (3) are satisfied; under such circumstances, the juvenile court has jurisdiction 
and "proceed[s] upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(d); (4). Additionally, even if jurisdiction is transferred to the district 
court, the S.Y.O. Act expressly provides that the juvenile court regains jurisdiction when 
there is an acquittal or dismissal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10). The reference in 
subsection (10) to section 78-3a-104 (1996) further emphasizes that this requirement is 
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jurisdictional since section 78-3a-104 outlines the "Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court-
Original-Exclusive." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104. The language of sections 78-3a-602 
and 78-3a-104 leaves no doubt that subsection (10) creates a jurisdictional requirement. 
Utah decisions also demonstrate that the statutes in Part 6 of Chapter 3 a of Title 78 
articulate the parameters of district court jurisdiction over juveniles charged with crimes. 
For example, State v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 995-98 (Utah 1995) refers to juvenile and 
district court jurisdiction in the context of its discussion regarding the constitutionality of 
the direct file statute. Id at 997, 998. In re A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1094-1099 (Utah App. 
1997) likewise uses the term "jurisdiction" when discussing the direct file statute (id. at 
1094), and indicates that the S.Y.O. Act creates district court jurisdiction when the 
requirements of the statute are met. Id. at 1095. In addition to the plain language of 
section 78-3a-602 and the other statutes in Part 6, Mohi and In re A.B. further 
demonstrate that the S.Y.O. Act creates jurisdictional limits; therefore, the jurisdictional 
requirements of section 78-3a-602(10) cannot be waived. See Appellant's brief at 6-8. 
The state ignores the plain language of the relevant statutes as well as Mohi and In 
re A.B. and instead argues that "had defendant been certified from juvenile court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 (Supp. 2000) on a charge of second or even third degree 
felony aggravated assault, the district court would have acquired subject matter 
jurisdiction over the defendant." S.B. at 7. This argument is irrelevant because Joseph 
was not certified; the issue before this Court involves interpretation of the S.Y.O. Act, 
5 
and speculation as to whether Joseph could have been certified has no bearing on that 
issue and does not create district court jurisdiction.1 
As its only support for the novel argument that the jurisdictional language of the 
Act does not define the limits on district court jurisdiction, the state relies on In re 
E.G.T.. 808 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1991). S.B. at 8. In In re E.G.T.. the minor appealed 
from the juvenile court certification order, claiming that he had been denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel at the certification proceedings. Id. at 140. While the appeal 
was pending, the case proceeded to district court, where the juvenile pled guilty. Id. at 
138-39. Reiving on In re Gault 387 U.S. l,41,87S.Ct. 1428, 1451, 18L.Ed.2d527 
1
 Without any support, the state suggests in footnote 1 to its brief at 7 that "if 
defendant succeeds in returning to juvenile court, he will likely be certified back to 
district court to stand trial on the charge of second degree felony aggravated assault." 
This Court should not consider this assertion because the state failed to adequately brief 
it, in violation of Utah R. App. P. 24. More importantly, the state's assertion is incorrect 
and not supported by the record. First, because judgment was originally entered against 
Joseph for a third degree felony, res judicata and the protection against double jeopardy 
preclude the state from proceeding on a second degree felony after the case was reversed 
on appeal. See discussion infra at 21-25. Additionally, certification is not a pro forma 
proceeding which culminates in district court jurisdiction over a juvenile at the snap of 
the state's fingers. Instead, the state has the burden of establishing "by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or the public 
for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(2)(b). Because 
a certification hearing has not been held, the ten factors which "the juvenile court shall 
consider, and may base its [certification] decision on" (Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(3)) 
are not part of this record and have not been considered by the juvenile court. In this case 
where the record does not demonstrate any of the factors or that such factors support 
certification, and the state is precluded from proceeding on the second degree felony, the 
state's claim in footnote 1 that Joseph will be certified to district court on a second degree 
felony charge is irrelevant, unsupported and incorrect. 
6 
(1967), this Court held that the right to counsel "is waivable, and, therefore, 
nonjurisdictional." In re E.G.T., 808 P.2d at 140. Even a superficial reading shows that 
E.G.T. waived only his claim that his right to counsel was violated at the certification 
proceedings and therefore does not address the issue in this case. 
The present case is distinguishable from In re E.G.T. because the issue is not 
whether a procedure at the juvenile court preliminary hearing Joseph's rights. Instead, 
the issue is whether the limitations on district court jurisdiction, as mandated by section 
78-3a-602(10), were violated when the trial court did not remand the case to the juvenile 
court after the initial conviction for a third degree felony. Because this issue directly 
addresses the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed with sentencing and entry of 
judgment, it is jurisdictional in nature and was not waived by Joseph's guilty plea. 
POINT II. THE JUVENILE COURT REGAINED JURISDICTION 
AFTER THE JURY ACQUITTED JOSEPH OF ATTEMPTED 
HOMICIDE. 
The state's argument that the juvenile court did not regain jurisdiction when 
Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide because Joseph was implicitly bound over 
on, and never acquitted of, the aggravated assault charges (S.B. at 9-17) fails because (1) 
attempted homicide is the relevant "charge'1 under subsection (10) and the jury acquitted 
Joseph of that "charge",2 and (2) even if this Court were to consider the state's argument 
2
 A rule of statutory construction found in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(l)(a) (2000) 
requires that plural and singular forms of a word are substituted for each other. Id. ("The 
singular number include the plural, and the plural the singular.") 
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that lesser offenses are "charges" within the meaning of subsection (10), Joseph was not 
implicitly bound over on the aggravated assault lessers because both versions of 
aggravated assault contained elements which are not included in attempted homicide. 
The state's alternative argument that second degree felony aggravated assault is a serious 
youth offender offense over which the district court has jurisdiction fails because that 
charge was dismissed, requiring remand to juvenile court and also because the Double 
Jeopardy precludes the state from prosecuting the second degree felony after Joseph's 
conviction for the third degree felony was reversed on appeal. 
A. The Juvenile Court Regained Jurisdiction Pursuant to Subsection (10) 
When the Jury Acquitted Joseph of Attempted Homicide, or Assuming. 
Arguendo, Joseph Was Bound Over on the Lessers, at the Time the Second 
Degree Felony Aggravated Assault Was Dismissed. 
1. The Jury Acquitted Joseph of Attempted Homicide, the Only Serious 
Youth Offender Offense on Which He Was Bound Over to District Court 
and the Only "Charge" in this Case. 
There is no question that the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide, the only 
charge filed against him in juvenile court. R. 109; see Addendum to this brief containing 
signed verdict form acquitting Joseph of attempted homicide. Since Joseph was acquitted 
of the only "charge" in juvenile court which provided a basis for bindover to district 
court, section 78-3a-602( 10) required that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction. 
The term "charges" in subsection (10) refers to charges which originate in juvenile 
court and on which the defendant is bound over. Statutes found in Chapter 3 a of Title 78 
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,fare not part of the criminal code, but are part of the Juvenile Courts Act;" they "were 
promulgated with juvenile procedures and issues in mind and were meant to apply to the 
juvenile context." State v. Harrison. 2001 UT 33,1fl7, P.2d . The "charges" in 
subsection (10) are therefore charges which arise in juvenile court and provide the basis 
for the bindover to district court, and not lesser offense instructions given at trial. 
The only "charge" filed in juvenile or district court prior to verdict was attempted 
homicide, the charge outlined in the Information. Although the state requested lesser 
offense instructions at trial, it did not file an Information charging aggravated assault 
prior to trial. R. 9-10.3 The state's request at trial that a lesser instruction be given does 
not turn those lesser offenses into subsection (10)"charges". In this case, the only charge 
to which subsection (10) could refer is attempted homicide. 
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7), the state argues that the "charges" 
which should be considered under subsection (10) are not limited to the charges which 
created district court jurisdiction and on which the juvenile was bound over, but instead 
include any lesser included offenses of the charges which created district court 
jurisdiction. S.B. at 10-14. Subsection (7) states: 
3
 On remand following the appeal, the state asked to proceed on the original 
Information which charged Joseph with attempted homicide. R. 171-76. While the trial 
court later orally amended the Information when Joseph pled guilty to third degree 
aggravated assault on remand following appeal, this amendment as part of the plea 
proceeding occurred well after the case should have been remanded to the juvenile court 
and therefore could not be a "charge" to be considered under subsection (10). 
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When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court 
for one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the 
same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies 
charged against him shall be considered together with those charges, and 
where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been 
committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also 
be bound over to the district court to answer for those charges. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7). 
The state's interpretation that the term "charges" in subsection (10) also refers to 
any other uncharged lesser offenses ignores the language and purpose of the S.Y.O. Act. 
While subsection (7) allows bindover of other charges from the same criminal episode as 
well as subsequent charges after a juvenile is bound over on a serious youth offender 
offense, subsection (7) requires the juvenile judge to find probable cause prior to any such 
bindover. A juvenile judge does not make an explicit finding of probable cause regarding 
lessers; moreover, in this case where the aggravated assault lesser contained elements 
which are not elements of attempted homicide, the juvenile court judge did not implicitly 
make such findings. See discussion infra at 15-18. Because the aggravated assault 
lessers were not offenses that were either explicitly or implicitly bound over by the 
juvenile judge, they are not relevant charges under subsection (10). 
The state's argument also ignores the fact that in the certification statute, the 
Legislature expressly provided that the juvenile could be convicted in district court of the 
offense charged or any offense arising out of the same criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-3a-603(13). The S.Y.O. statute does not contain similar language allowing the case 
to remain in district court on a a conviction for other offenses from the same criminal 
episode. Instead, the S.Y.O. statute allows other offenses to be tacked on when a case is 
sent to district court, but mandates that the case be returned to juvenile court if the 
juvenile is acquitted of the charges which provided the basis for the bindover. 
The state's interpretation of the term "charges" in subsection (10) to include lesser 
offenses based on the language of subsection (7) would render the requirement of 
subsection (10) meaningless. While the state argues in this case only that lesser included 
offenses are included in the meaning of the term "charges," its analysis based on 
subsection (7) would apply equally to other charges tacked on pursuant to subsection (7) 
following a bindover for a serious youth offender offense.4 Taken to its logical end, 
pursuant to the state's interpretation, subsection (10) would require remand to the juvenile 
court in only the rarest of cases where all of the S.Y.O. offenses, all offenses tacked on 
under subsection (7), and all lesser offenses are dismissed or result in acquittal. 
The focus in subsection (7) as well as the focus in the rest of the S.Y.O. Act, is on 
the serious offense which qualifies the case for district court jurisdiction. The fact that 
4
 Consider, for example, a juvenile who is bound over on a S.Y.O. charge of 
aggravated robbery. If the juvenile is subsequently charged with possession of tobacco, a 
class C misdemeanor, that misdemeanor will also be transferred to district court pursuant 
to subsection (7). After the case is in district court, if the aggravated robbery is dismissed 
because the witnesses identify someone else who confesses, the class C misdemeanor 
would nevertheless remain in district court under the state's interpretation. Such an 
approach does not further the purposes of the S.Y.O. Act. 
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subsection (7) allows the efficient prosecution of a juvenile who has been bound over on 
a serious youth offender offense by tacking on other offenses, does not change that focus. 
The purpose of the S.Y.O. Act, which is aimed at transferring jurisdiction over juveniles 
who commit serious violent felonies, is met by remanding cases to juvenile court when 
the juvenile is not convicted of the offense which provided the basis for the transfer. 
Conversely, the purpose of the statute is not furthered when the district court retains 
jurisdiction over a case after the juvenile is acquitted of the serious youth offender 
offenses or those offenses are dismissed. 
The state attempts to bolster its argument that this case should not be remanded by 
arguing that several jurisdictions allow the district court to retain jurisdiction when a 
juvenile is convicted of a lesser charge that would not have been a basis for adult court 
jurisdiction. S.B. at 11-12. The state's cases are, however, inapposite since they for the 
most part involve direct file statutes which do not contain a provision for remand if the 
juvenile is acquitted of the charges or the charges are dismissed. See cases cited in S.B. 
at 11-13. Since section 78-3a-602(10) controls this issue, the state's cases from other 
jurisdictions interpreting other statutes provide no guidance. 
Moreover, some courts have concluded that a case should be remanded to the 
juvenile court when the juvenile is convicted of a lesser charge which would not have 
supported district court jurisdiction, even when there is no statutory language requiring 
such a remand. See e ^ Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 156 N.E.2d 648, 652-53 (Mass. 
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1959); State v. Torres, 538 A.2d 185, 192 (Conn. 1988); State v. Bedford, 190 So. 347, 
351 (La. 1939). The rationale for remanding the case to juvenile court when the juvenile 
is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for the transfer but convicted of a 
lesser is that such an approach is consistent with the policies underlying the juvenile 
system. Torres, 538 A.2d at 192. Remanding a serious youth offender case to juvenile 
court when the juvenile is acquitted of the charge which caused the case to be transferred 
to adult court is likewise consistent with the policies underlying Utah's juvenile court 
system as well as the policies underlying the S.Y.O. Act. 
The state also attempts to bolster its position by arguing that the district court 
should retain jurisdiction over a lesser offense which does not otherwise sustain 
jurisdiction because otherwise trial courts could not instruct juries and could not accept 
guilty pleas on lesser offenses. S.B. at 13, citing State v. Morales, 694 A.2d 758, 762 
(Conn. 1997). This argument fails because (1) it incorrectly assumes that lack of 
jurisdiction to sentence a juvenile or enter judgment on certain charges means that a trial 
court cannot instruct the jury or accept pleas on lesser offenses; and (2) due process 
requires a lesser included instruction only when requested by the defendant under certain 
circumstances; in this case where the state requested an instruction on lesser charges 
which are not necessarily included in the charged offense, due process is not implicated. 
First, although section 78-3a-602(10) specifies that the juvenile court regains 
jurisdiction if the juvenile is acquitted of the charges, it does not preclude the district 
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court from giving an instruction on a lesser charge where appropriate. Indeed, 
subsection (10) requires remand to the juvenile court only after acquittal or dismissal of 
the charges; subsection (10) does not say that the trial court does not have the authority to 
submit a lesser included offense instruction to the jury or to accept a guilty plea to a lesser 
charge, each of which would occur prior to any acquittal or dismissal. This means that 
the district court has jurisdiction to conduct the trial pursuant to due process and statutory 
requirements, and the case is remanded to the juvenile court only if the juvenile is 
acquitted of the charges on which he was bound over or those charges are dismissed. 
Second, although nothing in the statute precludes a judge from instructing a jury 
on lesser offenses which are otherwise appropriate, even if the statute did preclude such 
instructions, due process was not implicated in this case where the state requested an 
instruction on lesser offenses which were not necessarily included in the original charge. 
The due process concerns outlined in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) and State v. 
Oldrovd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984), on which the state relies at page 13 of its brief, 
arise when a defendant requests an instruction on a lesser included offense, and the 
evidence "would permit a jury to find a defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not 
guilty of the greater " Oldrovd, 685 P.2d at 555. The state therefore incorrectly 
relies on Oldroyd and Beck in support of its claim that precluding a judge from 
instructing a jury on a lesser would raise constitutional concerns in this case where the 
state requested the lesser included instruction, and the elements of the lesser offenses 
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were not necessarily included in the charge of attempted homicide. By following the 
language of the statute and remanding a case to the juvenile court after acquittal, this 
Court would not also be adopting a rule that the district court cannot instruct on a lesser 
included offense or accept a lesser plea; such instruction or acceptance would occur prior 
to any acquittal or dismissal of the "charges11 and would not affect the district court 
jurisdiction over the S.Y.O. case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) required that the case be remanded to the 
juvenile court when the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide, the serious youth 
offender offense on which he was bound over to district court. In this case where Joseph 
was not charged with aggravated assault and was not bound over to district court on that 
charge, aggravated assault is not a relevant "charge" for purposes of subsection (10). 
Since the jury acquitted Joseph of the only relevant "charge" under subsection (10), Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) mandated that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction. 
2. The Elements of Aggravated Assault Are Not Necessarily Included in the 
Elements Found by the Juvenile Judge to Bind Joseph Over on Attempted 
Homicide. 
The state argues that subsection (7) of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996) allows 
the district court to retain jurisdiction over a serious youth offender case when a 
defendant is acquitted of the S.Y.O. offense which provided the basis for the bindover but 
convicted of a lesser included offense. S.B. at 10-14. According to the state, the district 
court has jurisdiction over the serious youth offender charge as well as any lesser 
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included offenses after a bindover from juvenile court because the juvenile court's finding 
of probable cause on the serious youth offender charge "' necessarily would include 
probable cause that the defendant also committed the lesser included offenses '" S.B. 
at 10, citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 691 N.E.2d 553, 556 (Mass. 1998). Pursuant to 
the state's argument, the requirement of subsection (7) that the juvenile court find 
probable cause to bind the juvenile over on any charges arising out of the same criminal 
episode or any subsequent charges which are bound over to district court is met with 
regard to lesser offenses because although the juvenile judge does not make an explicit 
finding of probable cause, such finding is implicit in the bindover on the greater charge. 
This Court need not decide in this case whether a lesser included offense is a 
charge on which a defendant is implicitly bound over under the S.Y.O.Act5 because the 
aggravated assault charges are not necessarily included in the attempted murder charge; 
the juvenile court judge's finding of probable cause to bind Joseph over on attempted 
homicide did not therefore include a finding of probable cause to bind Joseph over on 
aggravated assault charges. A comparison of the elements of attempted homicide with 
5
 Assuming Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7) requires an explicit finding by the 
juvenile court judge as to each charge on which the juvenile is bound over to district 
court, the state's argument that a juvenile is implicitly bound over on all lesser included 
charges fails. This Court need not reach this issue in this case, however, because (1) the 
aggravated assault elements were not necessarily included in attempted homicide and the 
juvenile judge therefore did not necessarily bind Joseph over on those charges, and (2) 
even if the juvenile court judge had bound Joseph over on the second degree felony 
aggravated assault, that charge was, at the very least, dismissed and the case must 
therefore be remanded to juvenile court. 
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the elements for the two forms of aggravated assault establishes that aggravated assault is 
not necessarily included in attempted homicide. See generally State v. Finlayson. 2000 
UT 10,If 16, 994 P.2d 1243 (statutory elements of a crime control whether a crime is 
lesser included offense). The elements of attempted murder, the S.Y.O. offense on which 
Joseph was bound over, are an attempt to knowingly or intentionally cause the death of 
another. R. 95; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1999). The elements for the two versions of 
aggravated assault submitted to the jury were a knowing or intentional assault which 
intentionally caused serious bodily injury or was accomplished by the use of a dangerous 
weapon or other means of force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. R. 96; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). Because an attempt to commit a homicide does not 
require causing serious bodily injury or using a dangerous weapon or the requisite force, 
the aggravated assault charges contain elements which are not necessarily included in the 
charge of attempted murder.6 The juvenile court judge's bindover on attempted murder 
6
 The state requested the lesser included instruction on aggravated assault in this 
case. R. 73. Because a transcript of the second day of trial does not exist, any discussion 
regarding the instructions is not recorded. Nevertheless, it was improper to give the 
instruction on the lesser offenses requested by the state because the elements were not 
"necessarily included'1 in the offense charged. See State v.Carruth. 1999 UT 107, ffl[5-18, 
993 P.2d 869 (elements of lesser charge requested by the state must be completely 
contained in charged offense); State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah 1998) 
(same); State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 155 (Utah 1983) (same). In the context of a serious 
youth offender case, where the basis for transferring jurisdiction to district court is the 
serious youth offender charge, allowing the state leeway in requesting instructions on 
lesser charges after the case is transferred to district court undercuts the purposes of the 
S.Y.O. Act in that it allows the state to overcharge a case in juvenile court in order to 
transfer it to adult court, then proceed in adult court on the lesser charge which the 
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therefore did not necessarily include a finding of probable cause to believe Joseph used a 
weapon and caused serious bodily injury.7 
Even if this Court were to entertain the state's argument that the "charges" in 
subsection (10) include offenses on which a juvenile was implicitly bound over, Joseph 
was not implicitly bound over on the aggravated assault offenses because those offenses 
involve additional elements which were not found by the juvenile court judge as part of 
the attempted homicide bindover. Because the juvenile court judge did not find those 
additional elements, Joseph was not bound over on the aggravated assault offense as 
required by subsection (7), and the aggravated assault offenses do not qualify as 
"charges" under subsection (10).8 
evidence actually supports. To the extent this Court embraces the state's argument and 
precludes remand when a juvenile is convicted of a lesser in adult court, prosecutors 
would be encouraged to overcharge their cases in order to establish an easy route to adult 
court in cases which do not otherwise qualify for adult court treatment. 
7
 The juvenile court's findings would have to include probable cause for the 
elements of both forms of aggravated assault since both versions were presented to the 
jury. 
8
 For a bindover under the S.Y.O. Act, the juvenile court finds not only probable 
cause to believe the crime was committed by the defendant, but also that the three 
retention factors are not met. In cases where the juvenile is bound over on a greater 
offense and that offense is dismissed in adult court, reliance on an implicit finding by the 
juvenile court that the juvenile also committed the lesser included offense does not satisfy 
the requirement that the juvenile judge also find that the three retention factors have not 
been met. Analysis of the retention factors, particularly those which consider the minor's 
role and culpability, may be different if only a lesser is considered. Accordingly, the 
S.Y.O. contemplates an explicit bindover finding in order to send any charge, even a 
lesser included offense, to district court. 
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B. The State's Alternative Argument Fails Because the Second Degree 
Felony Aggravated Assault Charge Was Dismissed and Subsection (10) 
Requires Remand When the Relevant Charge Is Dismissed; Moreover, 
Double Jeopardy Precludes the State from Proceeding on the Second 
Degree Felony. 
The state makes an alternative argument that even if "a district court loses 
jurisdiction over a serious youth offender who is acquitted of all charges that would have 
supported the original bindover to district court, defendant loses this appeal because he 
was never acquitted of second degree felony aggravated assault, a lesser included offense 
and an enumerated serious youth offense capable of supporting bindover.'1 S.B. at 14. 
This argument fails not only because Joseph was not implicitly bound over on the second 
degree felony, but also because (1) regardless of whether Joseph was acquitted of the 
second degree felony, it was dismissed and subsection (10) requires remand to the 
juvenile court if the relevant charge is dismissed, and (2) the protection against Double 
Jeopardy precludes the state from proceeding on the second degree felony, thereby 
effectively dismissing or acquitting Joseph of that charge. 
1. Even If this Court Were to Look Beyond the Charges filed in Juvenile 
Court, the Second Degree Felony Version of Aggravated Assault Was 
Dismissed; Since Subsection (10) Requires that the Juvenile Court Regain 
Jurisdiction If the Defendant Is Acquitted of the Charges or the Charges 
Are Dismissed, the Case Should Have Been Remanded to the Juvenile 
Court. 
Despite the clear acquittal on attempted homicide, the only "charge" against 
Joseph, the state argues that the requirement of subsection (10) that the juvenile court 
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not require remand to the juvenile court in this case because there is an ambiguity as to 
whether the jury convicted Joseph of second or third degree felony aggravated assault. 
S.B. at 114-18. In other words, according to the state, since we cannot be absolutely 
certain the jury did not convict Joseph of the second degree felony version of aggravated 
assault, Joseph was not acquitted of this S.Y.O. offense and the case must remain in adult 
court because Joseph has not been acquitted of all S.Y.O. offender offenses. Id. Even if 
this Court were to consider the lesser offense instructions as one of the "charges'1 under 
subsection (10), the state's claim that remand is not required because Joseph was not 
acquitted of the relevant charges is easily rejected since subsection (10) also requires that 
the juvenile court regain jurisdiction if the charges are dismissed. While the state goes to 
great lengths to argue that Joseph was not acquitted of second degree felony aggravated 
assault, it ignores the fact that regardless of whether Joseph was acquitted of second 
degree felony aggravated assault, that charge was dismissed following the trial pursuant 
to the state's own stipulation. R. 222:3-4. Since subsection (10) requires that the juvenile 
court regain jurisdiction when there is an acquittal or a dismissal, the entry of the third 
degree felony following the original trial constituted a dismissal of the second degree 
felony charge, thereby mandating that the case be remanded to the juvenile court. 
In this case, where pursuant to the stipulation of the state, the trial judge entered 
conviction for the third degree felony, the second degree felony version of aggravated 
assault was dismissed following the trial. Therefore, Joseph was convicted of a 
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non-serious youth offender offense and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (10) the 
juvenile court regained jurisdiction. 
2. Regardless of Whether the Jury Acquitted Joseph of the Second Degree 
Felony Version of Aggravated Assault, the Protection Against Double 
Jeopardy and Due Process Preclude Further Prosecution on the Second 
Degree Felony Aggravated Assault 
While the dismissal of the second degree felony easily does away with the state's 
alternative argument, the fact the state is precluded from reprosecuting Joseph on the 
second degree felony emphasizes that the case should have been remanded to the juvenile 
court. The Fifth Amendment protection against Double Jeopardy involves two 
protections; it bars reprosecution of a charge (1) where there is an acquittal, or (2) when 
the parties have litigated an issue and a final judgment of dismissal on the merits has been 
entered. State v. Bvrns. 911 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Ashe v. Swenson. 
397 U.S. 436, 443-46, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195-95, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970): United States v. 
BlackwelL 900 F.2d 742, 745 (4th Cir. 1990)). Both aspects of the protection bar the state 
from reprosecuting Joseph on the second degree felony. 
First, regardless of whether the jury acquitted Joseph of second degree felony 
aggravated assault, the state is barred from prosecuting Joseph on that charge based on 
the doctrine of res judicata as incorporated in the Fifth Amendment protection against 
Double Jeopardy. See United States v. Oppenheimer. 242 U.S. 85 (1916) (finality of 
previous adjudication bars reprosecution under Double Jeopardy protection). In 
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Oppenheimer, the Court held that a prior adjudication based on a statute of limitations bar 
precluded the government from later prosecuting that charge even though the prior 
adjudication was subsequently held to be incorrect in another case. Oppenheimer, 242 
U.S. at 87. Since the charge against Oppenheimer had been dismissed on the merits and 
final judgment entered, the subsequent ruling in another case that the statute of limitations 
did not bar the action had no impact on the finality of the judgment in Oppenheimer's 
case. In fact, the doctrine of res judicata, incorporated in the protection against Double 
Jeopardy, precluded the government from refiling the previously dismissed charge. IcL at 
86-88. The Court reasoned that "a judgment for the defendant upon the ground that the 
prosecution is barred goes to his liability as a matter of substantive law, and one judgment 
that he is free as a matter of substantive law is as good as another." Id. at 87; see also 
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46 (doctrine of collateral estoppel "is embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy"); Byms, 911 P.2d at 984 (Double 
Jeopardy "protects criminal defendants from having to relitigate issues that have been 
resolved in their favor by a valid and final judgment"); United States v. Blackwell, 900 
F.2d 742, 745 (4th Cir. 1990) (Double Jeopardy precludes successive prosecutions for the 
same offense as well as relitigation of issues which were "conclusively litigated and 
necessarily determined" as part of a previously entered judgment). 
The doctrine of res judicata, as embodied in the protection against Double 
Jeopardy, precludes the state from reprosecuting Joseph on the second degree felony 
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Jeopardy, precludes the state from reprosecuting Joseph on the second degree felony 
aggravated assault and further demonstrates that the case should have been remanded to 
the juvenile court when the trial judge initially entered a conviction for the third degree 
felony. After the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide but convicted him of 
aggravated assault, the state stipulated that because it could not be ascertained which 
version of aggravated assault the jury found, Joseph must be convicted for the third 
degree felony version. R. 222:3-4. After the state made this concession and the judge 
entered judgment of conviction for a third degree felony, the state did not appeal the entry 
of the third degree felony. That judgment is therefore final. See D'Aston v. D'Aston, 
844 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App. 1992) (doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of a claim 
where both actions involve the same parties, the claim was presented and fully litigated, 
and final judgment on the merits was issued). The state's claim for the first time in this 
appeal that the district court has continuing jurisdiction over the case because the jury did 
not acquit Joseph of the second degree felony is contrary to the protection against Double 
Jeopardy since any attempt to reprosecute Joseph on the second degree felony would 
violate that protection. 
The protection against Double Jeopardy also bars the state from prosecuting 
Joseph on the second degree felony under the implied acquittal rule of Green v. United 
States. 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957) and Price v. Georgia. 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970). 
Although the state argues that the implied acquittal rule does not apply because the 
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an acquittal on the second degree felony aggravated assault be implied. See Livingston v. 
Murdaush. 183 F.3d 300, 301 (4th Cir. 1999). 
In Livingston, the jury was incorrectly instructed that it would convict the 
defendant of either felony, driving under the influence or reckless homicide. The jury 
convicted the defendant of felony DUI and the prosecutor marked "judicial dismissal" on 
the reckless homicide indictment. Id at 301. Although the erroneous instruction resulted 
in uncertainty as to whether the jury acquitted Livingston of the reckless homicide, 
relying on Green and Price, the Court held that under the unusual circumstances of the 
case, an acquittal must be implied. Id. at 301-02. The court reasoned that this was 
particularly true in light of the dismissal of the reckless homicide charge. 
The facts in Livingston are substantially similar to those in the present case. 
Because the elements for both the second and third degree felony versions of aggravated 
assault were presented to the jury in a single Information, the jury could essentially 
convict Joseph of only one version of aggravated assault. The jury's verdict did not 
explicitly acquit Joseph of the second degree felony; it also did not, however, convict 
him. Under such circumstances, acquittal of the second degree felony must be implied.9 
9
 The state relies on Potts v. State, 369 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. 1988) for the proposition 
that the implied acquittal rule of Green/Price does not apply unless there is an 
unambiguous acquittal of the greater charge. S.B. at 15. Price v. Georgia and Green v. 
United States do not create the rigid requirement outlined by the state. Instead, the focus 
is on the impropriety, unfairness and chilling effect on the right to appeal which would 
occur if the government were allowed to prosecute a defendant who has successfully 
appealed his convicted by going forward on a greater charge than that from which he 
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In this case where the protection against Double Jeopardy precluded the state from 
reprosecuting Joseph on second degree felony aggravated assault, the state's argument 
that the district court had continuing jurisdiction over the second degree felony fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Joseph Tunzi respectfully requests that this Court order that 
his adult court conviction be stricken and the case remanded to juvenile court. 
(jk*Cu)^ 
JOAN C. WATT 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
appealed. Moreover, regardless of how the Georgia Supreme Court interprets the implied 
acquittal rule, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(1) (1999) precludes the state from prosecuting 
on a greater charge after a conviction has been set aside on appeal. 
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ADDENDUM 
In the District Court of the Tliird Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JOSEPH P. TUNZK 
VERDICT 
Caae No. 981926150 
Defendant 
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find th.e...de.f.endant,. 
. Joseph.. P.....Tunz±, Mt...G.ulLtx.M..MJ;.en[ipt.ed...Cr.iminal..HQ[ai.c.i.d£*...as...ch.ar.ged.. 
in the Information. 
.fe 19 11. 
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